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Abstract
Emerging market economies (EMEs), particularly the commodity exporter ones, are ex-
posed to world’s dynamics through different channels. In this paper, we consider the role of
(exogenous) commodity prices shocks in explaining business cycles in EMEs, by proposing
a financial transmission mechanism: the balance sheet effect. Our hypothesis is that a nega-
tive commodity price shock increases the firm’s external debt and the cost of the new debt.
In consequence, the aggregate investment decreases amplifying the output contraction. To
test it, we estimate a series of VAR models using quarterly data on corporate external debt,
nominal exchange rate, EMBI+ spreads, the local currency value of external debt to nomi-
nal GDP ratio and real GDP, covering the period 2000  2017. We do this for Latin America
and then, we focus on five particular economies: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
We find that balance sheets do matter and they exacerbate the output’s contraction when
the commodity price shock is negative. We also find that, turning the financial channel
off, the real GDP cumulative response in Latin America is smaller than in the unrestricted
model. Finally, we find no evidence on the existence of the balance sheet effect for Chile.
Keywords: Emerging Economies, Commodity Prices, International Business Cycles, Bal-
ance Sheet Effect, Nominal Exchange Rate.
JEL code: O110, F41, F44, G15.
1 Introduction
Many Latin American economies are strongly dependent on their country’s natural resources
endowment. Their export basket is mainly composed of commodities such as oil, hydrocarbon,
minerals and some agricultural raw materials. Although commodities’ share of total exports
has reduced since the 1970s, it remains relatively high compared to other regions (see for in-
stance, Gruss (2014) and Sinnott et al. (2010)).
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This commodity dependence exposes Latin American economies to global commodity price
dynamics. Being determined by supply and demand interaction, commodities prices exhibit
high volatility, which can affect both the primary sector and, indirectly, the entire economy. In
fact, Mendoza (1995) and, more recently, Vegh et al. (2017) state that commodity prices can be
a potential cause for business cycles in developing economies.
This dependency was especially clear through the last commodity boom, from the early
2000s until 20141, when many Latin American economies benefited from high commodity
prices. In the period from 2002   2013, together with an increase in the commodity prices
of more than 300%, annual average economic growth in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and
Peru was 4.60%. However, the end of the boom coincided with a strong decrease in the eco-
nomic growth rate in the same group: 1.72% between 2014 and 2016.
What can be expected when commodity prices fall? First, it is clear that the revenues from
the primary sector fall, which can affect the aggregate demand through less consumption, in-
vestment and taxes. Additionally, given that commodity-exporting economies tend to attract
foreign investment in their primary sector, volatility in prices may induce variability in nom-
inal exchange rate related to capital outflows (Reinhart et al., 2016). As a consequence of this
shock, the domestic economy experiences a decrease of internal demand, an output contraction
and a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
Now, conventional textbook wisdom highlights the advantages of devaluations, arguing
that they stimulate economic growth via an effect on net exports. This should occur both by
making gross exports more competitive (due to a lower-cost currency) and by increasing local
demand for domestically-produced goods due to importing goods being relatively more ex-
pensive2. Nevertheless, this is not the whole story.
An under-studied impact of depreciations is the one related to the balance sheets of com-
panies and governments that possess debt denominated in foreign currency (Ce´spedes et al.,
2004). In this context, exchange rates depreciations raises the local-currency value of compa-
nies’ debt overnight, thereby increasing their debt-service payments. This value effect implies
that firm-level investment decisions inside companies might be disturbed, resulting in undesir-
able effects on the firms, in particular, and on aggregate economic activity overall. As a result,
the currency mismatch between revenues and liabilities can cause exchange-rate depreciation
to be contractionary, instead of expansionary as the conventional wisdom states.
1Regarding to this episode, Gruss (2014) states that “oil prices in current U.S. dollars almost quadrupled between
2003 and 2013 and metal prices tripled, while food prices doubled and prices of agricultural products rose by about
50 percent” (pp. 6)
2An important point here to take into account is that all goods are not easily substituted, like capital goods, for
instance. This statement is related to consumption goods that are produced nationally.
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Concurrently, there is another consequence of variability in commodity prices. The in-
crease in the debt/net worth ratio can be reflected in the increase of the external financial
premium, which implies a decrease of the investment. The relationship between commodity
prices and interest rates is supported by Malone (2009), who shows that interest rate risk pre-
mium in commodity-exporting economies is strongly related to commodity prices. It follows
that commodity prices’ volatility also affects the borrowing cost (interest rate spread) faced
by entrepreneurs in such countries. Since a decrease in commodity prices lowers profitability
in these sectors and the entire economy is perceived as less attractive for foreign investors or
lenders, they may adjust their expected default rate higher and demand a higher spread over
interest rates to hold debt of businesses operating in the economy: this increased cost of bor-
rowing ultimately hinders new debt acquisition by entrepreneurs. This can be thought of as a
quantity effect.
Viewed in this way, balance-sheet effects constitute a sort of financial accelerator in the sense
of Bernanke et al. (1999) that can deepen business cycles due to the contraction of investment
caused by financial frictions, and to increase cycles’ volatility. As commodity prices rise, the
increased capacity for foreign indebtedness may lead to an even higher expansion in output.
In contrast, when prices fall, balance-sheet effects may accentuate the bust due to reduced in-
vestment.
Bearing all this in mind, it makes sense to explore the effects that commodity prices shocks
have on output through the performance of corporate balance sheets. This issue can be ap-
proached following the model of Ce´spedes et al. (2004), where the risk premium is a function
of entrepreneurs’ value of investment relative to net worth. In a similar way, Gertler et al. (2007)
also provide a relevant framework to answer this question, since they use a model similar to
the one in Ce´spedes et al. (2004) to explain the Korean crisis.
Regarding the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on companies’ balance sheets, most eco-
nomic investigations have focused on the micro level3. Evidence on the existence of balance
sheet effects related to exchange rate depreciation is mixed, although the literature has been
able to establish a negative correlation between exchange rates and firms’ investment. To the
best of our knowledge, little has been done to assess this matter at the macroeconomic level nor
to connect it explicitly to commodity-prices fluctuations.
All of the above points to an interesting research question to be answered. Our main goal
is to provide evidence of a different, often-ignored, cause of business cycles in developing
countries. We aim to untangle the linkage between the last commodity prices boom (from
3Bonomo et al. (2003), Benavente et al. (2003), Echeverry et al. (2003), Lobato et al. (2003) and Carranza et al.
(2003) carry out these firm size level studies for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico, respectively.
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2002  2014) and the existence of balance sheet effects in Latin America and on five economies
in particular: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
To achieve our goal, we estimate a series of VAR models, using as reference the conceptual
framework developed by Ce´spedes et al. (2004). We use quarterly data of commodity prices,
nominal exchange rate, EMBI spreads, external debt and real GDP data in our estimation. One
finding is that balance sheets are important business cycles drivers in the region. In particular,
we find that half of the output contraction is due to firm’s debt dynamics. Also, the behavior
of the region is representative of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
Another finding is that Chilean economy is significantly different from its counterparts and
the region. For this economy, real copper price does not seem to be a key driver of the business
cycle driver and the balance sheet effect is negligible. We believe this is due to Chile’s strong
institutional structure and, especially, the existence of the Economic and Social Stabilization
Fund (ESSF) and fiscal rules.
This paper is organized in five sections, including this introduction. In section 2, we discuss
how economic literature approaches commodity prices shocks and business cycles in emerging
economies and the balance sheet effect. In section 3, we describe our data and explore some
stylized facts for Latin America in general and the five studied countries in particular. Section
4 explains our methodology and presents estimation results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Commodity Prices, Interest Rates and Balance Sheet Effects
There is a vast economic literature4 linking commodity prices (or, similarly, terms of trade)
to real GDP cycles in emerging market economies (EMEs). This literature mainly considers
real and commercial channels, finding that commodity prices booms are related to expansions
in employment, consumption, investment and output, altogether with improvements in the
trade balance. Ferna´ndez et al. (2017a) use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model to estimate the transmission mechanisms of commodity-prices shocks to the real sec-
tor, through their effects on domestic goods demand. The authors find that commodity prices
display strong comovement with other macroeconomic variables. In fact, they find that com-
modity prices are procyclical and leading to output, investment and consumption. Moreover,
the authors also find that commodity prices are countercyclical to real exchange rates and the
external risk premium.
The model used by Ferna´ndez et al. (2017a) considers an endowment commodity sector that
faces fluctuations of its international price, which is taken as given by households. The model
4See, for example, Ferna´ndez et al. (2017b), Shousha (2016), Kose (2002), Tretvoll et al. (2017) and Charnavoki
(2010).
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has four agents: households, firms (domestic good producers), investment good producers
and the rest of the world. Foreign and domestic goods are used as inputs in the production of
investment goods and are also imperfect substitutes in household consumption. Households
offer labor services in the labor market and they receive commodity revenues due to an owner-
ship stake in the nation’s commodity endowment. Firms produce domestic goods using labor
and capital inputs.
In this framework, households can issue bonds in international financial markets, where
they pay a spread over international interest rate. The spread is considered exogenous and
stochastic, embodying other business cycle force. Additionally, the authors propose that com-
modity price movements are explained by a latent common factor and idiosyncratic shocks. In
the model, the only source of fluctuations of commodity prices is related to shocks to the com-
mon factor. Equation 1 presents the log-linearized version of the market clearing condition,
which allows for decomposition of the real GDP response to a positive shock in the commodity
price’s common factor, as the sum of three effects:
yt =

Ch
Y

cht| {z }
E f f ect 1
+

Xh
Y

xht| {z }
E f f ect 2
+

Ch
Y

cht| {z }
E f f ect 3
(1)
where letters without subscript represent steady state levels. Y is output, Ch is home good
consumption, Xh is domestic good used in investment good production and Ch is external
demand for home goods. Lower-case letters represent log deviations from steady state levels
(xt = ln(Xt)  ln(X)). Effect 1 embodies a domestic demand channel: the positive commodity
income shock leads households to increase their demand. Domestic relative prices increase in
response to this to stimulate production.
Effect 2 accounts for changes in new investment goods. On the one hand, to meet the in-
creased domestic demand, firms increase their capital demand and hence, pushes up capital
rental rate. On the other hand, demand for new investment goods also increases, and so does
their price. Together, this results in an increase in the demand for domestic goods.
Lastly, effect 3 is related to the response of external demand for home goods. Given that
the commodity income boom induces an increase in domestic prices, the economy is less com-
petitive in international markets. As a result, home goods become relatively more expensive,
which detriments its demand from foreigners.
The net effect of the commodity shock on aggregate output will depend on the strength
of the aforementioned effects. In turn, every effect depends on the economy’s structural pa-
rameters describing firms, households and the behavior of producers of investment goods.
Assuming that effect 3 is not large enough to counterbalance effects 1 and 2, the net effect is
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positive and, in the new equilibrium, the real exchange rate appreciates5. Lastly, in the em-
pirical strategy, the authors find that the model correctly replicates patterns exhibited by EME
data, particularly those from Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru.
As a final remark regarding the model of Ferna´ndez et al. (2017a), it is worth noting that in-
terest rates spreads are not explicitly modeled as a function of commodity prices. Furthermore,
this model does not consider the external debt dynamics nor the currency mismatch problems
that could take place between households’ incomes and liabilities. Nevertheless, this paper
makes clear the connection between commodity prices and real output in EMEs.
The financial channel or balance sheet effect of debt denominated in foreign currency has
been approached in the economic literature as a phenomenon related to external interest rates
shocks. Along these lines, Ce´spedes et al. (2004) develop a theoretical model with financial fric-
tions6 where debt is dollarized and country risk premium is endogenous. The authors show
how devaluations in the exchange rate can be detrimental for economic performance, which
contradicts traditional textbook wisdom.
In this context, the authors solve the financial contract problem between domestic entrepreneurs
and foreign lenders. In doing so, they make an extension to Bernanke et al. (1999) in an open
economy context to find a critical equation that guarantees interest rate parity:
Et(Rt+1Kt+1/St+1)
QtKt+1/St
= (1+ rt+1)(1+ ht+1) (2)
Equation 2 equalizes the expected return of the entrepreneur’s investment project and the
international safe interest rate (1 + rt+1). Entrepreneurs must pay a spread over the interna-
tional interest rate, ht+1 or risk premium, that reflects the informational asymmetries in finan-
cial contract enforcement. Now, in equilibrium, the entrepreneur’s net worth, denominated in
local currency, is7:
Nt = d [(1 Ft)aYt   (1+ rt)EtDt] (3)
where Et = St/Pt is the real exchange rate, d is the unconsumed proportion of entrepreneur’s
net worth and (1  Ft) reflects monitoring costs paid in the contract enforcement. It is inter-
esting in equation 3 that, given real income, Yt, and contemporaneous risk premium, a real
devaluation negatively impacts the entrepreneur’s net worth because it increases the burden
of interest payments associated with inherited debt.
5A reasonable conclusion is that, given the economic structure modeled, a fall in commodity prices would cause
a depreciation in exchange rates. Besides, the net effect in output would depend on the relative strength of (com-
mercial) effect three in equation 1 with respect to the other effects.
6In their model, financial frictions are due to informational or enforcement problems.
7This equation holds in nominal terms as well. For details, see equation 12 in Ce´spedes et al. (2004)
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A key feature of Ce´spedes et al. (2004) model is that risk premium is an increasing function
of the investment cost-net worth ratio, as shown by Bernanke et al. (1999):
1+ ht+1 = F

QtKt+1
PtNt

, F(1) = 1, F0() > 0 (4)
The functional form of risk premium, displayed in equation 4, incorporates the balance
sheet effects in the model. This effect is related to investment decisions in a firm that pos-
sesses debt denominated in a foreign currency: whenever the exchange rate depreciates, the
local currency value increases and so do interest payments. If the firm obtains revenues in lo-
cal currency, it automatically has to make a greater effort to repay its debt, forcing it to reduce
investment and hence, production.
In particular, the authors are interested in studying the effects of an unanticipated and tem-
porary increase in the safe international interest rate, rt+1, under both flexible and fixed ex-
change rate regimes. This shock causes an increase in the exchange rate. The authors find
that balance sheet effects are relevant and can amplify the effects of foreign disturbances. This
magnification is particularly sharp when the economy is financially vulnerable and the con-
ventional effect of exchange-rate depreciation is overshadowed by the financial effect.
A model in the same vein as Ce´spedes et al. (2004) is that of Gertler et al. (2007), who
propose a financial accelerator model–where the exchange rate regime is linked to financial
distress– to explain the South Korean crisis of 1997  1998. The authors explain that the Korean
crisis was triggered by a reduction in that country’s sovereign risk rating by Standard & Poor’s.
This caused capital flight and a sharp increase in the country risk premium. In turn, to main-
tain fixed exchange rates, the central bank responded by raising interest rates. This response,
combined with higher country risk, ultimately resulted in a deterioration of economic activity.
The financial accelerator mechanism proposed by the authors connects borrower balance
sheets to the external risk premium in the financial contract. Agents interacting in the model
are: households, firms (entrepreneurs, capital producers and retailers) and a government. As
in Ferna´ndez et al. (2017a), there are both domestic and foreign goods that are imperfect sub-
stitutes. In this model, the country borrowing premium for external debt is a function of net
foreign indebtedness, NFt, and a random shock, Ft:
Yt = f (NFt)Ft, with f 0() > 0 (5)
The authors claim that this specification of the borrowing premium is useful because it
helps to replicate the apparent cause of Korean crisis. They associate the observed capital flight
with an increase in the random variable Ft.
On the production side, entrepreneurs are the key players. In order to produce, they must
finance their capital demand through their own net worth at the end of period t, Nt+1, and
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nominal bonds, Bt+1. In this context, entrepreneurs and lenders solve a financial contract with
costly bankruptcy yielding a financial premium, given by:
ct() = c
0BB@
Bt+1
Pt
Nt+1
1CCA , c0() > 0, c(0) = 0, c(¥) = ¥ (6)
It is clear from equation 6 that the financial premium faced by entrepreneurs is an increas-
ing function of their leverage ratio: the higher this ratio is, the higher the interest rate that
entrepreneurs must pay. This is the financial accelerator mechanism.
Now, how does the shock on country risk premium, i.e., an increase in Ft in equation 5
trigger the financial accelerator mechanism and affect output? The massive capital outflow
causes the central bank to increase nominal interest rates, in order to protect the fixed exchange
rate. Given nominal rigidities in the retail sector, real interest rate also rises, inducing a con-
traction in output. This is exaggerated by the financial accelerator mechanism: the higher real
interest rate generates a reduction in asset prices which, in turn, reduces the entrepreneurs’ net
worth and, hence, increases their leverage ratio. As stated in equation 6, higher leverage raises
entrepreneurs’ financial premium, which ultimately leads to a reduction in investment and a
sharper output contraction.
Although initially the authors consider the case where these bonds are denominated in do-
mestic currency, they extend their model in order to account for what happens when debt is
denominated in foreign currency. One interesting finding is that the contraction in investment
after the shock is almost twice as big when the debt is denominated in foreign currency than
in the unrestricted case. Furthermore, as in Ce´spedes et al. (2004), Gertler et al. (2007) find that
flexible exchange rates are more desirable than fixed exchange rates in terms of the effect on
output. This means that the financial accelerator mechanism is actually more detrimental when
a currency mismatch exists.
We have seen that, on the one hand, commodity prices shocks are connected to output cy-
cles, but that the mainstream economic literature tends to leave the financial channel outside
their models. On the other hand, the balance sheet effect has been studied under frameworks
considering interest rates disturbances, leaving commodity prices shocks as exogenous. Given
this, we propose that a negative shock in commodity price has the same effects as a positive
shock in world’s safe interest rate, as proposed by Ce´spedes et al. (2004) and a positive shock
in the country risk, as in Gertler et al. (2007). Our intuition is that when commodity prices fall,
the domestic economy as a whole is less attractive to foreign investors or lenders.
Lastly, an assumption we will make in our analysis, that is also found implicitly in Ce´spedes
et al. (2004) and Gertler et al. (2007), is that entrepreneurs can not use any financial instrument
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in order to hedge the risk of unexpected exchange rate fluctuations, which will provide a way
to connect commodity prices shocks to firm’s liabilities. This assumption makes sense in EMEs,
where financial markets are incipient and the access to financial instruments is limited.
3 Data and Some Stylized Facts
3.1 Data
First, we will consider Latin America and then we will focus on Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mex-
ico and Peru, because each is a net commodity exporters. We exclude Ecuador and Panama
because these are dollarized economies and Venezuela because of the political instability that
characterizes its economy. Uruguay and Bolivia are excluded due to lack of data availability.
Central American countries are too small to be considered and, as stated by Sinnott et al. (2010),
these are net commodity importing economies.
We gather data from different sources. Real and nominal GDP information is collected from
CEPAL database, which provides quarterly data in local currency units. Total non-financial
private-sector external debt expressed in U.S. dollars is retrieved from each country’s central
bank. Although it is possible that we are considering debt originally denominated in curren-
cies different from the U.S. dollar, the largest proportion of external debt in the economies we
consider is, in fact, originally denominated in dollars.
Nominal exchange rate data is also taken from each country’s central bank. Besides, we con-
struct the local currency value of external debt as the product between the nominal exchange
rate and dollar debt for each country. EMBI spread data, used as a proxy for the risk premium,
is collected from JP Morgan and converted into quarterly data by computing daily averages.
We select these variables because we are interested in studying how commodity prices shocks
affect corporate external debt and real GDP cycles, through nominal exchange rate and risk
premium.
There are differences in the time period covered: the Brazilian case is examined over the
2001Q4  2017Q2 period, while Chilean covers from 2003Q1 to 2017Q3. Colombian and Pe-
ruvian cases cover the period 2000Q1  2017Q2 and Mexican data is available from 2002Q1 to
2017Q2.
To obtain data for Latin America as a whole, we considered our five countries and add Ar-
gentina and Paraguay. These seven countries represent a large proportion of the entire GDP
of Latin American8. External debt in dollars is simply added for every economy since it is all
8Actually, according to World Bank data, these seven economies represent 83% of Latin American and the
Caribbean GDP in the period 2000  2016.
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expressed in the same currency. Now, given that CEPAL reports quarterly national accounts
information only in local currency, national account data was transformed into dollars. We per-
formed this transformation by multiplying real GDP in a base period (2011Q4) by the nominal
exchange rate in the same period. Then, to obtain a GDP in constant base period dollars, we
calculated it using growth rates of real GDP in local currency units.
The nominal exchange rate index (in the Latin American case) is computed as a weighted
average of country-specific indexes. Here, again, the base period is 2011Q4. The weights are
calculated as the participation of each country in the group of seven. The same procedure was
used to compute the LCU external debt to GDP ratio from every economy’s ratio data. The
Latin American EMBI is calculated by JP Morgan, and we have this information in the period
2000Q1  2017Q1.
Finally, some descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1. It is noticeable that Chile has
the highest LCU-debt-to-GDP ratio and, at the same time, the lowest EMBI+ spreads. Column
4 in Table 1 displays quarterly GDP growth rates, which shows that Colombia and Chile are
markedly higher than their counterparts and the region. Column 5 shows commodity prices
growth, and min and max statistics allow us to observe their volatility.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Latin America and five EMEs
Country
LCU Debt
to GDP ratio
EMBI+
(bp)
Real
GDP Growth
Commodity Price
Growth
Mean Mean Mean Mean Min Max
Latin America 31.64% 496.8898 0.62% 0.95% -51.94% 16.62%
Brazil 23.44% 435.732 0.59% 1.52% -21.30% 27.94%
Chile 95.81% 149.9758 0.93% 1.14% -65.09% 37.02%
Colombia 30.44% 319.1614 0.95% 0.22% -67.93% 32.06%
Mexico 28.90% 210.9567 0.49% 0.22% -67.93% 32.06%
Peru´ 40.44% 287.1461 0.59% 1.52% -21.30% 27.94%
3.2 Stylized Facts
We present some empirical regularities analysis for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru
compared to the Latin American region as a whole. Figure 1 presents the calculated correlation
coefficients9 for our five EMEs and the region. These correspond to the correlation between
cyclical components of every variable in period t and the commodity price in period t+ j with
j =  4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. Regarding dollar debt (panel a), in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico,
9The statistical significance of these coefficients is tested, yielding that all of them are statistically different from
zero.
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the commodity-relevant price10 shows a procyclical and leading movement with respect to this
variable. This means that dollar debt reacts in the same direction, and after, commodity price
changes. Furthermore, these economies exhibit the same behavior as Latin America. Chile and
Peru behave differently from their counterparts and the region, since the commodity price is
countercyclical and lagged with respect to debt in USD, meaning that dollar debt moves before
and in the opposite direction of commodity price change.
The commodity price variable is countercyclical and contemporary to the LCU-debt-to-
GDP ratio (Panel b). In the case of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the region. This contrasts
with the Chilean and Peruvian case, where this variable is lagged. A strong finding in this pa-
per is the countercyclical and contemporary relation between the nominal exchange rate and
commodity price (Panel c). This is found both for the region as a whole and for each of the five
economies studied. Considering that dollar debt is procyclical and the nominal exchange rate
is countercyclical, LCU debt dynamics would initially depend on whether the quantity effect is
greater than the value effect explained above. Since LCU debt turns out to be countercyclical,
it allows us to conclude, at least preliminarily, that the value effect dominates.
Regarding EMBI spreads (our risk premium proxy), we find that commodity price is coun-
tercyclical and has a one period lag (Panel d). This is true for all economies and the region,
except for Brazil, where it is contemporary. Finally, it is also clear from Panel e in Figure 1 that
commodity price is procyclical to GDP and contemporary for Colombia and the region, while
it is leading in the other economies. This exploratory and preliminary analysis supports the
existence of a balance sheet effect caused by commodity price volatility both in the region and
the five economies individually.
10In the cases of Brazil and Peru, we construct a commodity-price index using: i) soybeans, iron, sugar, oil and
poultry meat and ii) copper, gold, oil and zinc, respectively. For Chile, we only take into account the copper price,
while in Colombia and Mexico, we use oil price.
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Figure 1: Correlation coefficients - Cyclical components - Latin America and five EMEs
(a) External Debt (USD) (b) LCU External Debt to GDP ratio
(c) Nominal Exchange Rate (d) EMBI
(e) Real GDP
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4 Methodology and Estimation Results
For our empirical strategy, we use the cyclical component of the log of every variable. We
extract the cycle using Hodrick-Prescott filter with 1600 as the smoothing parameter11. This
allows us to obtain percentage deviations from steady state in impulse response function anal-
ysis derived from our model.
We estimate a VAR(p) model for each economy, with five variables: a commodity-price
index, the nominal exchange rate, the EMBI spread, LCU external-debt-to-GDP ratio and real
GDP. In general, the equation to estimate is as follows:
Yt = bDummy(2008Q4) +
p
å
i=1
AiYt i + et (7)
where Yt is a 5x1 vector with the endogenous variables ordered as above. A dummy vari-
able for period 2008Q4 is also included, in order to control for the financial crisis. In construct-
ing Impulse Response Functions (IRF) and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD), we
use 70% confidence intervals12. IRF and FEVD are presented only for Latin America and Chile.
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru exhibit the qualitative behavior of the region, while Chile is
noticeably different.
4.1 Latin America
The Latin America model is estimated with two lags. Figure 2 presents the impulse response
function resulting from a one standard deviation negative shock in the commodity price index
cyclical component13. It is clear that when the commodity price reduces, nominal exchange
rate, EMBI spreads and LCU debt to GDP ratio increase, reflecting the countercyclical relations
found before. In contrast, real GDP exhibits the expected procyclical behavior. These effects
are statistically significant for around three periods (quarters).
At first sight, the magnitude of the responses might look negligible but it is worth noting
that these are quarterly responses. In order to obtain a clearer response, we aggregate the quar-
terly changes to get the annual (cumulative) response. For this exercise, we alter the magnitude
of the shock in order to capture the variation in commodity price index from boom to bust, as
shown in figure 6 in Appendix A14 These calculations are presented in Table 2.
11We used alternatives cycle measures, yielding no significant differences with respect to the Hodrick-Prescott
filter.
12In VAR model applications, it is usual to find confidence intervals of up to 68%. This practice became popular
since Sims and Zha (1999) published their very influential paper.
13Diagnostic tests were performed in each model and results are available for the interested reader.
14Boom was observed in 2014Q2, corresponding to a positive deviation from its long run trend of 19.35% and bust
in 2016Q1, where it was  30.81%. This corresponds to a fall of approximately 50.34% in the eight periods covered.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Function - One standard deviation shock in commodity price index
- 70% confidence intervals
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Table 2: Cumulative responses - Impulse Response Function to a 2.5 standard deviation nega-
tive shock in commodity price index.
Step
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
LCU Debt
to
GDP Ratio
Real
GDP
0 0.0893 0.2265 0.0771 -0.0089
1 0.0857 0.1592 0.0797 -0.0148
2 0.0444 0.0534 0.0324 -0.0131
3 0.0064 -0.0215 -0.0070 -0.0067
Cumulative
response
21.93% 38.57% 18.92% -4.35%
Table 2 shows that when the commodity price index falls in almost 20% in a period, the
cumulative significant response in real GDP would be approximately 4.4% three periods after
the shock. The effect on the nominal exchange rate and LCU-debt-to-GDP ratio are significant
until two quarters after the shock, yielding cumulative changes of 22% and 19%, respectively.
EMBI spread is significant only a period after the impulse, with a cumulative response of 38.6%.
14
Figure 3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - 70% confidence intervals
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Finally, forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) from this model is presented in Fig-
ure 3. Based on this, one can conclude that around 60% of forecast error variance of the nomi-
nal exchange rate is due to commodity price shocks. This proportion is approximately 30% for
EMBI spread. Regarding LCU-debt-to-GDP ratio and real GDP errors, we find that commodity
price shocks explain roughly 40% of them.
According to these results, we conclude that commodity prices shocks do play an impor-
tant role in explaining the dynamics of the economic variables included, both in the region and
the five EMEs, except for Chile. It is particularly interesting that external debt does react to
changes in commodity prices. But, is this evidence enough to conclude that the balance sheet
effect actually exists? To answer this question, we estimate a VAR model restricting the external
debt to not respond to commodity prices shocks. This provides a counterfactual exercise that
allows us to obtain the responses that would take place if the financial mechanism were not
relevant.
Table 3 displays the cumulative responses of the unrestricted model and the restricted
model. We compare significant cumulative responses in both models. In terms of the nomi-
nal exchange rate, depreciation is 10% higher in the unrestricted model. It implies that, since
entrepreneurs make debt service payments in dollars, their demand for foreign currency exac-
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erbates the exchange rate depreciation originally caused by commodity price fall.
Regarding EMBI spread, the unrestricted model again generates a higher response than the
restricted. This might be related to the underlying financial accelerator. The intuition is that a
commodity price fall induces a first increase in EMBI spreads because economy is less attrac-
tive for foreign lenders but, since entrepreneurs’ net worth is negatively affected by the initial
shock, it provokes a further increase in risk premium.
Table 3: Impulse response function comparison: Unrestricted model vs. Restricted model -
Negative shock in commodity price index of 20%
Step
Unrestricted model Restricted model
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
0 0.0902 0.2288 -0.0090 0.0989 0.2580 -0.0065
1 0.0866 0.1608 -0.0150 0.0228 -0.0013 -0.0100
2 0.0448 0.0539 -0.0132 -0.0003 -0.0133 -0.0055
3 0.0064 -0.0217 -0.0068 0.0048 0.0101 -0.0013
Cumulative
response
22.16% 38.96% -4.40% 12.14% 25.80% -2.20%
Significant
periods
0-2 0-1 0-3 0-2 0 0-2
Lastly, the GDP contraction is higher in the unrestricted model. We again attribute this find-
ing to the financial accelerator. First, the fall in commodity price reduces commodity exports
and, ceteris paribus, aggregate demand. Then, given the increase in debt service payments,
firms cannot easily carry out investment projects. The increased risk premium hinders new
debt acquisition to finance investment. Thus, the financial accelerator causes a further contrac-
tion in aggregate demand and, hence, in real GDP. Based on these results, we conclude that
the balance sheet effect exists, and that it plays an important role deepening business cycles
associated with commodity price disturbances in EMEs.
Finally, cumulative responses in impulse response functions and forecast error variance de-
composition for Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru are displayed in Table 4.115. Since we are
considering shocks of the same magnitude, these results are comparable. Brazil appears to be
the most vulnerable economy to commodity-price disturbances: it has the highest increases
in exchange rate and risk premium, while having the deepest GDP contraction. Disconcert-
15Impulse Response Function and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition from the estimated model for each
economy are presented in Appendix B.
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ingly, unlike its counterparts, in the Peruvian case, EMBI spread and LCU-debt-to-GDP ratio
are countercyclical to commodity prices.
Table 4: Cumulative responses and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - A one standard
deviation negative shock in country-specific commodity price.
Brazil Colombia Mexico Peru
Nominal
Exchange Rate
Cumulative
Response
13.86% 8.13% 8.76% 3.19%
FEVD 33.01% 25.37% 49.68% 24.60%
EMBI
Spread
Cumulative
Response
13.92% 13.45% 5.19% -16.04%
FEVD 10.84% 13.43% 14.76% 8.45%
LCU Debt to
GDP Ratio
Cumulative
Response
9.06% 6.27% 4.64% -15.24%
FEVD 20.91% 20.23% 34.26% 19.41%
Real GDP
Cumulative
Response
-1.04% -1.02% -0.86% -0.69%
FEVD 17.59% 10.76% 14.34% 9.06%
4.2 The Chilean case
In the Chilean case, we run the model on inflation-adjusted copper price, which is deflated
using US consumer price index. We estimate Equation 7 with p = 2. The impulse response
function to a negative one standard deviation shock in the real copper price is displayed in Fig-
ure 4. Qualitative behavior of endogenous variables is the same as in the region. Significance
of these responses persists, at most, four quarters after the shock. For instance, the effect on
the nominal exchange rate, EMBI+ spreads and LCU-debt-to-GDP ratio is only significant on
impact, after that, we can not reject the null hypothesis of the response being different from
zero. Real GDP response is significant from period 1 to 4.
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Function - One standard deviation shock in real copper price - 70%
confidence intervals
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
0.02
0 5 10 15 20 25
Real Copper Price
−0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0 5 10 15 20 25
Nominal Exchange Rate
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0 5 10 15 20 25
EMBI+
−0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0 5 10 15 20 25
LCU Debt to GDP Ratio
−0.004
−0.003
−0.002
−0.001
0.000
0.001
0 5 10 15 20 25
Real GDP
As can be seen in Figure 8 of Appendix A, the last copper price fall, between 2014Q3 and
2016Q1 was not so extreme. In fact, from boom to bust, the copper price varied 23.48%, which
in average represents a variation of 3.35% per quarter. Given this, cumulative responses are
calculated using a one standard deviation shock.
Table 5: Cumulative responses - Impulse Response Function to a one standard deviation nega-
tive shock in real copper price.
Step
Nominal
Exchange Rate
EMBI
Spread
LCU Debt
to GDP Ratio
Real GDP
0 0.0163 0.0315 0.0153 -0.0006
1 0.0052 0.0168 0.0028 -0.0018
2 0.0001 -0.0072 -0.0017 -0.0026
3 -0.0004 -0.0231 0.0001 -0.0026
4 0.0000 -0.0263 0.0011 -0.0018
Cumulative
response
1.63% 3.15% 1.53% -0.89%
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Table 5 displays the results of the cumulative response analysis. Since the nominal exchange
rate, EMBI+ spreads and LCU-debt-to-GDP ratio are only significant on impact, the responses
are, as can be seen in the third row of the table, 1.63%, 3.15% and 1.53%, respectively. In the case
of GDP, the cumulative response, corresponding to periods 1 to 4 after the shock is  0.89%.
The Chilean case is remarkably different from its counterparts and the region. This can be
attributed to the institutional structure characterizing this economy, which have allowed it to
establish credibility and a good reputation in the international markets. Besides, the existence
of the economic and social stabilization fund (ESSF) may help cushion the economy from the
effects of copper price volatility and, hence, soften the business cycles caused by it. In fact, as
explained by Solimano and Caldero´n (2017), by dampening the effects of international copper
price volatility on the Chilean economy, the fund also helps stabilize fiscal budgets and policy.
Figure 5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - 70% confidence intervals
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Figure 5 exhibits the forecast error variance decomposition for the Chilean case. According
to this analysis, around 10% of nominal exchange rate and real GDP error variance is explained
by copper price shocks. The fraction of the error variance of both EMBI+ spreads and LCU-
debt-to-GDP ratio explained by copper price variation is less than 10%. These are, again, low
numbers revealing that copper price may not have a relevant role in the explanation of Chilean
business cycles. Moreover, it is important to note that Chile has the highest LCU-debt-to-GDP
ratio and, in spite of that, we find no evidence of this deepening business cycles.
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5 Conclusions
Emerging market economies, particularly the commodity exporter, are exposed to global dy-
namics through different channels. In this paper, we considered the role of (exogenous) com-
modity prices shocks in explaining business cycles in EMEs. Mainstream economic literature
relates the commodity prices disturbances to business cycles through the traditional commer-
cial channel, leaving aside the potential role played by financial variables.
We go further this approach by proposing a financial transmission mechanism of commod-
ity prices shocks: the balance sheet effect. The existing economic literature usually approaches
this effect via international interest rates shocks, without taking into account the commodity
prices. We aim to connect the latter to the balance sheets of firms that possess debt denomi-
nated in foreign currency. In this context, there is a currency mismatch between firm’s revenues
and liabilities, hindering investment and production when depreciation in exchange rate takes
place.
Our hypothesis is that firms’ external debt dynamics are related to an exogenous macroeco-
nomic variable: commodity price. An increase in this variable reduces both nominal exchange
rate and risk premium, facilitating external debt acquisition by domestic firms. But, when-
ever commodity prices fall, the opposite happens and hinders firm’s investment. In this sense,
we propose that the balance sheet effect acts as a financial accelerator that: when commodity
prices are high, it amplifies economic expansions (through the increased investment), but when
commodity-price conditions are adverse, it deepens output contraction.
To test our hypothesis, we estimated a series of VAR models using data from Latin America
and in five individual economies: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. We use corporate
external debt, nominal exchange rates, EMBI+ spreads and real GDP data. Besides, we con-
struct the local currency value of external-debt-to-nominal-GDP ratio.
Our estimations allow us to conclude that Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru exhibit the
observed qualitative behavior in the region. All variables comove as expected with commodity-
relevant price measures, i.e., nominal exchange rate, EMBI spreads and the debt ratio are coun-
tercyclical, while real GDP is procyclical. Chile constitutes a remarkable exception, as we found
no evidence of copper price disturbances being a business cycle driver. We attribute these find-
ings to Chile’s ESSF and other institutional arrangements, such as fiscal policy rules. Moreover,
in the Chilean case, the fact that this economy has the highest external-debt-to-GDP ratio seems
not to be relevant.
To account for the magnitude of the balance sheet effect, we estimated the same VAR model
as before but constraining the impact of the debt ratio on the other variables, and vice versa,
20
to be zero. By doing so, we attempt to answer how the variables in the system would have
responded if the financial channel were not important.
Comparing impulse response functions and cumulative responses for the region and the
economies (excepting Chile), we find that balance sheets do matter in that they exacerbate the
output contraction when the commodity price shock is negative. We find that, turning the fi-
nancial channel off, the real GDP cumulative response in Latin America is smaller by half than
in the unrestricted model. Responses on nominal exchange rates and EMBI spreads are ap-
proximately 10% and 13% smaller, respectively. Again, Chile exhibits different behavior from
the region.
An implicit assumption we make in our paper is that companies do not hedge exchange-
rate risk. This is a limitation that could be overcome in future works. It would also be important
to propose a theoretical model that consideres the effects of commodity prices in EMEs through
both the traditional and financial channels. Furthermore, Structural VAR models could be use-
ful to capture contemporaneous relations between variables, which are also observed in the
stylized facts.
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Appendix A
Figure 6: Commodity Price Index - Latin America
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Figure 7: Commodity Price Index - Brazil
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Figure 8: Real Copper Price - Chile
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Figure 9: Real Oil Price - Colombia and Mexico
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Figure 10: Commodity Price Index - Peru
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Appendix B: IRF and FEVD
5.1 Impulse Response Functions
5.1.1 Brazil
Figure 11: Impulse Response Function - One standard deviation shock in commodity price
index - 70% confidence intervals
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5.1.2 Colombia
Figure 12: Impulse Response Function - One standard deviation shock in real oil price - 70%
confidence intervals
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5.1.3 Mexico
Figure 13: Impulse Response Function - One standard deviation shock in real oil price - 70%
confidence intervals
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5.1.4 Peru
Figure 14: Impulse Response Function - One standard deviation shock in commodity price
index - 70% confidence intervals
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5.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
5.2.1 Brazil
Figure 15: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - 70% confidence intervals
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5.2.2 Colombia
Figure 16: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - 70% confidence intervals
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5.2.3 Mexico
Figure 17: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - 70% confidence intervals
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5.2.4 Peru
Figure 18: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - 70% confidence intervals
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 5 10 15 20 25
Nominal Exchange Rate
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0 5 10 15 20 25
EMBI+
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 5 10 15 20 25
LCU Debt to GDP Ratio
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0 5 10 15 20 25
Real GDP
32
Appendix C: Estimated Balance Sheet Effects
Brazil
Table 6: Impulse response function comparison: Unrestricted model vs. Restricted model -
Negative shock in commodity price index of 20%
Step
Unrestricted model Restricted model
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
0 0.0448 0.0349 0.0013 0.0729 0.0930 0.0016
1 0.0794 0.0591 -0.0068 0.0418 -0.0321 -0.0080
2 0.0815 0.0908 -0.0086 0.0217 0.0041 -0.0089
3 0.0682 0.1044 -0.0078 0.0215 0.0625 -0.0052
4 0.0521 0.1040 -0.0061 0.0246 0.0868 -0.0022
5 0.0382 0.0935 -0.0044 0.0208 0.0770 -0.0010
6 0.0270 0.0759 -0.0031 0.0123 0.0535 -0.0009
Cumulative
response
39.11% 46.87% -3.36% 21.56% 37.29% -2.22%
Significant
periods
0-6 2-6 1-5 0-6 0, 3-6 1-3
Chile
Table 7: Impulse response function comparison: Unrestricted model vs. Restricted model -
Negative shock in real copper price of 20%
Step
Unrestricted model Restricted model
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
0 0.0490 0.0969 -0.0018 0.0637 0.1026 -0.0041
1 0.0153 0.0569 -0.0057 0.0152 0.0572 -0.0050
2 0.0001 -0.0138 -0.0082 0.0020 -0.0009 -0.0065
3 -0.0008 -0.0626 -0.0080 -0.0008 -0.0465 -0.0060
4 0.0006 -0.0741 -0.0058 0.0001 -0.0618 -0.0042
5 -0.0009 -0.0620 -0.0030 0.0016 -0.0525 -0.0022
6 -0.0041 -0.0465 -0.0007 0.0024 -0.0333 -0.0008
7 -0.0063 -0.0363 0.0006 0.0024 -0.0164 -0.0001
Cumulative
response
4.90% -12.19% -2.78% 7.89% -3.43% -2.80%
Significant
periods
0 0, 4-7 1-4 0-1 0-1,3-6 0-5
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Colombia
Table 8: Impulse response function comparison: Unrestricted model vs. Restricted model -
Negative shock in real oil price of 20%
Step
Unrestricted model Restricted model
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
0 0.0402 0.0734 -0.0014 0.0487 0.0888 -0.0014
1 0.0304 0.0643 -0.0021 0.0249 0.0543 -0.0022
2 0.0232 0.0508 -0.0025 0.0127 0.0312 -0.0024
3 0.0179 0.0367 -0.0025 0.0063 0.0151 -0.0022
4 0.0138 0.0240 -0.0024 0.0028 0.0040 -0.0018
5 0.0106 0.0139 -0.0021 0.0010 -0.0028 -0.0014
6 0.0081 0.0063 -0.0017 0.0000 -0.0064 -0.0010
7 0.0061 0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0077 -0.0007
8 0.0045 -0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0075 -0.0004
Cumulative
response
13.61% 22.51% -1.71% 9.25% 17.44% -1.11%
Significant
periods
0-5 0-3 1-8 0-3 0-2 1-6
Mexico
Table 9: Impulse response function comparison: Unrestricted model vs. Restricted model -
Negative shock in real oil price of 20%
Step
Unrestricted model Restricted model
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
0 0.0254 0.0502 -0.0036 0.0303 0.0600 -0.0046
1 0.0331 0.0366 -0.0041 0.0259 0.0182 -0.0033
2 0.0313 0.0077 -0.0039 0.0202 -0.0096 -0.0021
3 0.0255 -0.0191 -0.0028 0.0151 -0.0256 -0.0011
4 0.0188 -0.0374 -0.0013 0.0110 -0.0328 -0.0002
5 0.0125 -0.0463 0.0002 0.0080 -0.0343 0.0005
6 0.0074 -0.0475 0.0014 0.0059 -0.0324 0.0010
7 0.0036 -0.0435 0.0022 0.0044 -0.0288 0.0012
8 0.0010 -0.0366 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0246 0.0013
9 -0.0006 -0.0285 0.0027 0.0027 -0.0206 0.0013
Cumulative
response
14.65% -15.29% -1.44% 12.07% -13.92% -1.01%
Significant
periods
0-5 0-1, 4-9 0-3 0-7 0, 3-9 0-2
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Peru
Table 10: Impulse response function comparison: Unrestricted model vs. Restricted model -
Negative shock in commodity price index of 20%
Step
Unrestricted model Restricted model
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
Nominal
Exchange
Rate
EMBI
Spread
Real
GDP
0 0.0464 0.0112 0.0023 0.0843 0.0740 0.0027
1 0.0815 0.0212 -0.0056 0.0478 -0.0477 -0.0075
2 0.0850 0.0321 -0.0081 0.0281 -0.0226 -0.0084
3 0.0735 0.0391 -0.0088 0.0261 0.0078 -0.0063
4 0.0586 0.0394 -0.0079 0.0248 0.0149 -0.0038
5 0.0453 0.0335 -0.0063 0.0188 0.0073 -0.0019
6 0.0338 0.0231 -0.0045 0.0110 -0.0009 -0.0007
Cumulative
response
42.41% NA -4.12% 24.09% 7.40% -2.59%
Significant
periods
0-6 None 1-6 0-6 0 1-4
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